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SPECIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS. Grégoire C.N. Webber.1 
Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. viii + 231. $95.00. 
John Oberdiek2 
Ours is an age of rights. The language of rights permeates 
moral and political discourse. What rights we have, and what it 
means to have them, are matters of public debate that are as 
familiar as they are vital. Discussions of free expression, privacy, 
or abortion, for example, are almost always cast in terms of the 
rights to free expression, privacy, and abortion. And it is not 
hard to explain, at least in part, why this is so. A political culture 
revolving around rights is cultivated and sustained by a 
constitutional democracy. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, constitutions themselves give pride of place to rights. 
Constitutions define a political framework whose guarantees are 
defined as rights. Second, rights flourish in constitutional 
democracies because they serve as a lingua franca. They provide 
a single recognized and seemingly stable normative currency 
when the moral pluralism characteristic of democracies might 
otherwise threaten the possibility of there being any common 
coin whatsoever. Constitutional democracies like ours create and 
support a culture of rights, then, due to the twin natures and 
attendant pressures of constitutionalism and democracy. 
This explanation of the importance of rights in a 
constitutional democracy, though, illuminates neither what 
constitutional rights themselves are nor how—to say nothing of 
how well—they play the role they are assigned within our 
political culture. Indeed, by conceiving of constitutional rights as 
guarantees and as a stable normative currency, the explanation 
can mislead. It can lend itself to a facile picture of constitutional 
rights that no one accepts, in which the constitutional status of 
 
 1. Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics. 
 2. Professor, Rutgers School of Law - Camden. 
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any legislation or conduct can be determined just by invoking 
abstract rights. Things are not so simple. Constitutional rights 
may be guarantees, but not against everything; rights may also 
serve as a stable common currency, but the currency is not fixed 
and inflexible. There is no democratic constitutional regime 
whose practices suggest otherwise. In fact, most democratic 
constitutions or international charters of rights explicitly 
incorporate what is known as a limitations clause (or a set of 
tailored ones) that qualifies the rights there established. This is 
true of, for example, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
German Basic Law, the South African Bill of Rights, and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights. The Canadian Charter is 
representative, guaranteeing its enumerated rights “subject only 
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”3 The 
Canadian Charter and other similar fundamental legal 
instruments recognize rights, then, but only in tandem with a 
limitations clause. The rights are necessarily subject to whatever 
constraints the clause articulates. Interestingly, the United States 
Constitution is the exception that proves the rule, if it is an 
exception at all: its Bill of Rights contains no express limitations 
clause, and yet the Supreme Court, of course, interprets the 
rights contained therein to be limited in various ways, which is 
why even the First Amendment does not protect, say, 
incitements to imminent violence or child pornography. This 
suggests that a limitations clause simply makes explicit what is 
already implicit whenever rights are invoked, namely, that rights 
are limited in scope. 
Granting that constitutional and other charter rights are 
typically guaranteed subject to an express limitations clause, 
what does it mean to say that they are so qualified and what can 
we learn about constitutions and constitutionalism more 
generally by reflecting on the ubiquity and role of limitations 
clauses? In The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of 
Rights, Grégoire C. N. Webber offers contrarian answers to 
these questions with an ambitious reconceptualization of 
constitutions and their rights. His primary target is “the received 
approach” to limitations clauses, and its sins are many, according 
to Webber: 
 
 3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
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It endorses an overzealous definition of rights, which results 
in rights-claims to everything thereby prompting almost all 
legislation (and State action more generally) to conflict with 
some right. In consequence, there are frequent, and indeed 
expected and unavoidable conclusions that rights have been 
infringed. Yet, countless rights-infringements are, as a matter 
of course, justified, with the result that it is now a governing 
assumption of the received approach that rights are not 
absolute and that they are generally opposed to or in 
competition with the public interest. The definition of a right 
is determined on the basis of the individual claimant’s interest 
alone and does not take into account other rights or 
considerations not part of the right’s purpose; these 
considerations are all relegated to the limitation clause 
analysis. . . . That analysis—considered to be primar[il]y if not 
exclusively a judicial undertaking—draws on a ‘balancing of 
interests’ and a requirement of ‘proportionality’ between the 
right and the limitation, which is informed by evidence and 
(albeit only ostensibly) political morality (p. 88). 
Webber rejects the received approach, root and branch. He 
rejects what he believes is the false technicality of its 
proportionality and balancing analyses, its hyper-individualistic 
conception of rights, its denigration of popular legislation as 
inherently antagonistic to rights and concomitant worship of the 
judiciary, and its denial that rights are absolute. But the received 
approach errs most fundamentally, on his view, in its 
“overzealous definition of rights” (p. 88). 
Its definition of rights is overzealous, at bottom, because of 
overreaching: according the received approach, if a constitution 
or charter grants a right to free expression, for example, then 
everything that counts as expression is subsumed by the right. No 
normative distinctions are made, at this stage, between protected 
and unprotected expression. The received approach thus takes 
the generality of the formulation of rights literally, as entailing 
universal application—one’s right is to free expression, not to 
some free expression. This is the crux of the first of Webber’s 
complaints about the received approach’s understanding of 
rights. Given how capaciously the model construes rights, 
legislation will almost always tread upon someone’s right to 
something, and that gives the legislative process—and 
democracy more broadly—a bad name. At a minimum, 
construing rights as the received approach does regularly forces 
a choice between our commitment to rights and our commitment 
to democracy. 
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Webber’s second complaint about the received approach’s 
conception of rights is closely related. He contends that its 
overzealous definition of rights actually robs rights of the 
normative force that is widely held to distinguish them. This is 
evident, according to Webber, in the two-stage analysis of 
constitutionality necessitated by the approach’s all-
encompassing model of rights: one determines, first, whether a 
right has been infringed and, only if one has been, whether the 
infringement is justified according to the limitations clause. It is 
therefore the limitations clause, taken up at the second stage of 
the inquiry, and not the antecedently-defined right, that does (at 
least the majority of) the justificatory work. Defining the right or 
determining what constitutes the right is, on this view, a 
straightforward empirical exercise of interpretation. 
Determining whether some conduct is covered by a right to free 
expression, for example, requires determining (only) whether 
the conduct in question counts as expression, which is just a 
matter of interpretive fact. Even concluding that some conduct is 
expression and is therefore covered by the right, however, entails 
nothing about whether that conduct is actually protected by the 
right. In distinguishing between coverage and protection in this 
way, Webber charges, the received approach reveals that rights 
themselves lack normative purchase. For whether a right 
actually protects anything, and does not merely cover it, is a 
function of the content of the independent limitations clause, not 
of the right itself. Webber thus indicts the received approach for 
underplaying the normative force of rights. 
Webber’s most fundamental positive thesis, in contrast, is 
that constitutional rights are actually constituted by their 
accompanying limitations clause. On the view he endorses, it 
makes no sense to distinguish and lexically order defining the 
right and assessing the justifiability of its abridgement. Instead, 
according to Webber, the very definition of a right draws upon 
those multifarious considerations that the received approach 
reserves to the second stage of its analysis, concerning the 
limitations clause. What is reserved to the second stage of 
analysis under the received approach, in other words, gets folded 
into the first stage under Webber’s approach, so that one cannot 
define a right without knowing the right’s limitations—what it 
does and does not protect or entitle one to. The definition of any 
right, in this way, incorporates the conditions of its permissible 
contravention. 
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Conceptualizing rights this way, Webber contends, 
addresses the two chief shortcomings of the received approach. 
First, if rights are defined so as not to conflict with justified 
limitations on them, then legislation will not, as a matter of 
course, be antagonistic to rights. For if legislative enactments are 
justified—and surely many of them are—they will necessarily not 
conflict with anyone’s rights. The happy upshot is that no choice 
is forced between democracy and rights. Second, if rights are 
constituted by their limitations, then rights themselves have a 
normative heft that they lack under the received approach. 
Having a right, on this view, entails having conclusive normative 
protection against some treatment or a conclusive entitlement to 
something. Insofar as the received approach treats rights as 
descriptive empirical categories, it fails to do justice to the 
normativity or prescriptivity of rights. Webber offers a corrective 
to this conceptual shortcoming: to retain the normativity of 
constitutional rights, their very definition must incorporate their 
limitations, and those are (often) conveniently marked out in a 
limitations clause. 
So conceived, the definition of constitutional rights is more 
open-ended than the received approach admits. The limitations 
clauses upon which the definition of constitutional rights depend 
are, after all, themselves open-ended. The Canadian Charter’s 
limitations clause, which again allows limits on rights that “can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,” 
surely provides for a great deal of latitude in determining how to 
limit the rights it recognizes, even as it focuses the inquiry on the 
values of freedom and democracy. For the ideal of a free and 
democratic society is an abstract and open-textured one. This 
does not mean that rights cannot be misconstrued or limited in 
ways that are mistaken or just plain wrong. Latitude is not 
license. Webber makes this clear when he maintains that “the 
improper limitation of a right poses a challenge to the political 
legitimacy of the State.” (p. 18) Still, there is no single proper 
limitation. There are only values or principles, many of which 
are incommensurable, that must be heeded and given due regard 
in limiting constitutional rights. And while different extant 
limitations clauses may cite various legitimating considerations, 
Webber believes that two general principles are paramount, 
underlying all sound limitations clauses and thus all legitimate 
constitutions: “the principle of democracy” (p. 18), which 
emphasizes popular sovereignty, and “the principle of human 
rights” (p. 21), which captures those basic rights not subject to 
!!!OBERDIEK-271-SPECIFYINGCONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2010  10:49 AM 
236 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:231 
 
majoritarian control.4 Even these, however, are merely 
regulative principles and do not dictate any single correct 
limitation on constitutional rights. Discretion and judgment are 
unavoidable. 
This prompts Webber to re-imagine constitutional rights 
and constitutions themselves as negotiable: “[t]he constitution of 
a democratic constitutional State, and especially constitutional 
rights, ought to remain open, on an on-going basis, for 
democratic re-negotiating” (p. 13). If constitutional rights are 
not static and wooden as on the received approach, but dynamic 
and entirely compatible with justifiable legislation as Webber 
argues, then a constitution and the rights it recognizes can be 
cast and recast as circumstances on the ground and normative 
commitments change. And in a democracy, Webber contends, 
negotiating and re-negotiating rights is the job of the legislature. 
Webber’s is thus a form of common law constitutionalism in 
which the constitution is regarded as itself an “activity,” but with 
the legislature playing the role that the common law reserves for 
judges. Indeed, it is Webber’s view, following Jeremy Waldron 
and others, that “[t]he legislature alone is in a position to be 
both an authority constituted by the constitution as well as an 
authority with the political legitimacy to re-negotiate the 
constitution—that is, to (continue to) be a constituent authority” 
(p. 149). The discretion that is inescapably called for in limiting 
constitutional rights and in assessing those limitations is thus 
properly exercised by, and only by, the people’s elected 
representatives. 
Much as a court lacks plenary authority to adjudicate more 
than the case before it and so will not completely specify the 
contours of any particular right at one fell swoop, however, “the 
legislature . . . does not, in the normal case, take it upon itself to 
engage completely with the limitation of a right. It rather seeks 
to delimit a right by legislating certain aspects of the limitation 
of that right, from time to time” (p. 171). Envisioning only 
piecemeal legislative limitations of rights, Webber echoes Cass 
Sunstein and likens the constitution itself to an incompletely 
theorized agreement. The agreement is, however, always 
provisional. For “[t]he legislature is free to change, even 
radically, the legislative limitation of a constitutional right over 
 
 4. See also p. 182, where Webber maintains: “With the exception of the European 
Convention’s appeal to ‘necessity’, the idea of justification in a free and democratic 
society animates the question of a right’s limitation in all limitation clauses.” 
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time, from one generation to the next, from one election to the 
next, even from one sitting of the legislature to the next” 
(p. 175). A constitution is indeed an activity, and quite possibly a 
constant one. 
There is a good deal that is attractive in Webber’s picture of 
constitutional rights, constitutions, and constitutionalism. Its 
originality lies in the way he combines existing but seemingly 
unrelated positions into a single multi-faceted theory. As 
Webber’s theory is a synthesis of positions that others, including 
the present author,5 have developed in greater depth, however, it 
cannot help but have a derivative feel in places. Webber could 
have advanced debate further and avoided this criticism had he 
endeavored to develop the constituent positions that his overall 
view comprises instead of just helping himself to them as if they 
were store bought. There was a missed opportunity here. Still, 
the synthesis itself is indeed novel and, I think, a real 
contribution to the literature on constitutional theory. In the 
remainder of this discussion, my primary aim is to explore how 
successful Webber is in applying the specified theory of rights, 
which I have defended in other contexts, to constitutional law. 
While I think Webber needs to tread more carefully in places, 
overall I find his account of constitutional rights appealing. 
Let me begin by very briefly summarizing the theory of 
rights, called the specified conception of rights or 
specificationism, which I have defended and that Webber 
explicitly incorporates as the central plank of his overall 
platform.6 It will be largely familiar from the above synopsis of 
Webber’s view, which hews quite closely to my own view about 
rights. In contrast to what I referred to as the general conception 
of rights, which “first identifies the content of whatever right is 
at issue and only then determines what the right’s normative 
implications are in the circumstances,” I held that 
 
 5. Webber draws heavily from my work on the theory of rights, quoting from my 
papers at length and generally echoing many of their points in the keystone chapter, 
“Constituting Rights by Limitation,” and citing them in twenty-three footnotes over 
thirty pages (pp. 116–46). Those papers are John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the 
Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights, 23 LAW & PHIL. 325 
(2004); John Oberdiek, Specifying Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
127 (2008) [hereinafter, Oberdiek, Specifying]; and John Oberdiek, What’s Wrong with 
Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong): A Reply, 27 LAW & PHIL. 293 
(2008) [hereinafter, Oberdiek, What’s Wrong]. 
 6. I am not the first to defend this theory. The most famous invocation of it comes 
in Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). As it 
happens, Thomson later renounced her specificationism. I discuss this in Oberdiek 
What’s Wrong, supra note 5, at 293–94.  
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specificationism “identifies the content of a right in light of and 
indeed in response to what is justifiable to do under the 
circumstances . . . so as not to conflict in the first place with 
justifiable behaviour.”7 Rights might be stated in general terms, 
on my view, but rights actually are specified, so that the 
seemingly general right not to be killed, for example, which 
reads as a right not to be killed full stop, is truly the right not to 
be killed unjustly. I supported this conclusion with arguments 
too involved to repeat here, but which can be gleaned from 
Webber’s discussion—specificationism makes better sense of the 
way we argue towards rights and neither reifies nor renders 
rights redundant, for starters. 
The foregoing overview underlines the striking parallel in 
the structures of both the received approach to constitutional 
rights and the general conception of rights simpliciter, as well as 
Webber’s and my respective contrary positions. Both the 
received approach to constitutional rights and the general 
conception of rights analytically distinguish the question of what 
a right itself is from the question of what a right calls for in any 
particular case. Both views, in other words, hold that rights can 
be defined independently of their justified abridgement and both 
also hold that rights can be justifiably abridged. On the former 
view, it is primarily legislation that tests the right, and one looks 
to a limitations clause to see if the potentially offending 
legislation can, in the circumstances, be justified in the clause’s 
terms. On the latter view, it is conduct of any kind that tests the 
right, and one looks to normative facts to determine whether, in 
the circumstances, the potentially offending conduct is 
compatible with the right. Webber’s and my respective views, in 
turn, collapse these two stages: Webber maintains that 
constitutional rights are constituted by their limitations clause, 
while I contend that rights are specified so not to conflict with 
morally justifiable conduct. 
The relationship between the received approach and 
Webber’s view, on the one hand, and the general conception of 
rights and specificationism, on the other, is thus analogous. But 
the two antithetical pairs of views are not identical. What the 
two conventional views part over, and what Webber and I part 
over, is the standard for abridging an antecedently defined right, 
as the conventional views would have it, or, as Webber and I 
would put it, for defining the content of the right itself. The 
 
 7. Oberdiek, Specifying, supra note 5, at 128 (quoted in part by Webber at p. 131). 
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received approach and Webber’s alternative to it appeal 
exclusively to a posited, if open-textured, limitations clause. The 
general conception of rights as well as the specificationism that I 
endorse look instead to normative considerations wherever and 
whatever they might be. This difference is due to the fact that 
Webber’s focus is constitutional legal rights while mine is moral 
rights and, at one remove, common law rights. And it is that 
difference that gives me pause in signing on to Webber’s 
application of specificationism to constitutional law. 
The relationship between legality and morality is, of course, 
a source of continuing inquiry and puzzlement in general 
jurisprudence, and the difficulty of cleanly distinguishing 
between the two when rights are at issue is especially difficult. 
This is because moral rights are particularly legalistic. H. L. A. 
Hart suggests as much in maintaining, “the concept of a right 
belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically 
concerned to determine when one person’s freedom may be 
limited by another’s and so to determine what actions may 
appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules.”8 
Moral rights, one might say, are law-apt. Moral rights are 
nevertheless distinct from legal rights, and a fortiori from 
constitutional rights, and what makes for a compelling account 
of moral rights does not necessarily make for as compelling an 
account of constitutional rights. 
A distinguishing feature of specificationism, which Webber 
locates and finds attractive in his own account of constitutional 
rights, is its dynamism. A right of free expression, again for 
example, may protect this kind of speech but not that kind, or 
the same kind of speech in some circumstances but not others. 
The moral right of free expression (as well as every other moral 
right) is, in this way, entirely context-dependent. According to 
specificationism, unless all the considerations that are relevant to 
the justifiability of expressing oneself in a given way in a given 
context are brought to bear, the right of free expression is simply 
indeterminate. Ascribing to someone a right of free expression, 
full stop, is therefore tendentious. There are just too many ways 
and too many contexts in which one may not express oneself 
however one sees fit to make so sweeping a declaration. Moral 
rights as a class, as they are understood on the specified 
conception of rights, cannot be the carte blanche that the general 
conception of rights assumes them to be. 
 
 8. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 177 (1955). 
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There is much that can be said in response to these claims, 
to be sure, but the question I wish to pursue is whether Webber’s 
embrace of this dynamism about constitutional rights is 
advisable and appropriate. An implication of specificationism’s 
dynamism is that one argues towards and not from rights. For if 
rights themselves are conditional in the way that specificationism 
entails, then rights cannot be invoked in arguing for a normative 
conclusion. That would beg the question. A right is not a 
consideration to be factored into an all-things-considered 
judgment of what is permissible, according to specificationism, it 
rather represents the all-things-considered conclusion about 
permissibility. And conclusions are what we argue towards. 
Of course, as a matter of actual practice, it will make a great 
deal of sense to appeal to rights in moral or legal argument. 
Rights stated in general terms are useful placeholders. When 
invoked this way, they purport to summarize the balance of a 
common subset (but only a subset) of considerations that bear 
on what people are ultimately entitled to do. Even if specified at 
some deep level, general rights can thus play a helpful heuristic 
role in normative argument. It would be unreasonable to expect 
people to start from scratch, beginning with normative primitives 
and working their way up, every time they actually engage in 
normative argument.9 Rights conceived this way are a kind of 
normative shortcut. Now, Webber endorses my criticism that 
rights conceived generally are merely intermediate conclusions 
about what is permissible and are not, as under specificationism, 
the final conclusions that we really seek about what is ultimately 
permissible. If what ultimately matters are the duties that our 
rights actually impose, then the general conception of rights 
cannot be the correct theory, for the normative power of general 
rights is always subject to further context-specific considerations. 
But this philosophical vice has its virtues, and one of them is 
practicality, whether the rights at issue are moral or legal. So 
long as we all know what we are all doing in appealing to baldly 
stated rights that appear to lack any express qualifications, like 
“the right of free expression” or “the right to privacy,” there is 
no problem. Webber need not disagree. 
A different kind of pragmatic consideration, however, might 
seem to drive a wedge between moral and constitutional rights, 
 
 9. I make this point in Oberdiek, Specifying, supra note 5, at 133: “As a practical 
matter, it is of course useful to advert to rights as a way of holding constant the 
multifarious considerations that justify a particular right.” 
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suggesting that specificationism is not the best account of 
constitutional rights, even if it is the best account of moral rights. 
On the best account of constitutional rights, in other words, one 
might in fact argue from them, even if one only argues towards 
specified moral rights. Although he does not distinguish between 
kinds of rights in the following passage, Joseph Raz captures 
why this might be so: 
Assertions of rights are typically intermediate conclusions in 
arguments from ultimate values to duties. . . . The fact that 
practical arguments proceed through the mediation of 
intermediate stages so that not every time a practical question 
arises does one refer to ultimate values for an answer is . . . of 
crucial importance in making social life possible, not only 
because it saves time and tediousness, but primarily because it 
enables a common culture to be formed round shared 
intermediate conclusions, in spite of a great degree of 
haziness and disagreement concerning ultimate values.10 
Raz here mentions the first pragmatic consideration canvassed 
above, that general rights are a convenient handmaiden in 
practical reasoning, but it is the second that is key; namely, that 
rights conceived generally make social life possible in a 
pluralistic society precisely because they only state intermediate 
conclusions that prescind from their fundamental justifying 
values. How might this observation counsel against specifying 
constitutional rights? 
One need not claim that politics and law are discontinuous 
with morality to recognize that norms governing the former 
domains need to be public in a way that moral norms need not 
be. Morality is, first and foremost, a system of norms governing 
individual conduct, after all, while politics and law are systems of 
norms governing collective and social conduct. The truth about 
moral rights therefore need not answer to the demands of 
publicity to the extent or in the way that the truth about 
constitutional rights must. The content of any moral right 
depends on belief-independent moral facts along with empirical 
facts about circumstances. The moral facts are the moral facts, 
the empirical facts are the empirical facts, and controversy or 
uncertainty about either is usually irrelevant. The same cannot 
be said of an analogous politically legitimate constitutional right. 
The content of any politically legitimate constitutional right 
surely does depend, in part, on what people generally take the 
 
 10. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (1986). 
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moral status of the relevant conduct to be and the relevant non-
moral facts to be. Controversy is not irrelevant here. For no 
constitutional framework can be politically legitimate (which is 
not to say just or legally valid) if the norms it enshrines take no 
stock of the beliefs, moral or non-moral, held by the people 
whom the constitution purports to govern. This puts a unique 
pressure on constitutional rights—they are held to a standard 
that moral rights are not. 
Raz’s observation suggests that rights conceived generally, 
as intermediate conclusions about one’s entitlements, offer a 
way of deflecting this pressure and meeting this additional 
standard because they focus attention on what we agree about—
the existence of some broadly-stated right—and away from what 
we likely disagree about: namely, the exact implications of the 
right and the fundamental moral considerations that justify it. 
General rights, like alcohol, thus serve as a kind of social 
lubrication. They allow people with diverse moral outlooks to 
share common moral standards, even if only in the abstract, 
which facilitate social life because no one need either commit up 
front to an exhaustive set of conclusive duties or display their 
deepest normative commitments. They can just focus on the 
widely shared intermediate conclusions represented by general 
rights, no matter how contestably those intermediate conclusions 
might be applied in practice or were reached. This is the way in 
which general rights serve as a lingua franca, noted at the outset. 
They are like poker chips in Monte Carlo: one can purchase 
them with any number of diverse currencies and everyone 
recognizes their universal value regardless of the currency used 
to buy them. Raz appears to believe that this function is an 
important desideratum of any type of rights, but I would submit 
that in light of the distinctive publicity concerns canvassed 
above, it applies only to legal rights and especially to 
constitutional rights. 
This, in turn, seems to entail that the received approach to 
constitutional rights has more going for it than Webber 
recognizes. Raz’s observation, suitably focused on constitutional 
rights, suggests that there is good reason not to elide the 
distinction between the definition of a constitutional right and its 
limitation. Specified constitutional rights, the argument goes, 
would fail to take the social dimension of those rights seriously. 
That generally conceived constitutional rights are mere 
intermediate conclusions about one’s entitlements and not final 
conclusions about them is not the shortcoming that it is in the 
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case of moral rights, which need not be sensitive to the demands 
of publicity. Quite the contrary, it is a credit to the view, 
counting in favor of the received approach to constitutional 
rights. And that seems correct. For this reason, Webber is 
perhaps too quick to apply specificationism to constitutional 
rights. The case for specificationism cannot be transposed from 
moral rights to constitutional rights as straightforwardly as he 
seems to think. 
This is not to say, however, that specificationism about 
constitutional rights is misguided. Any credit that is due to the 
received approach for its doubly pragmatic conception of rights 
is surely defeasible. What must be shown is that the social 
benefit of understanding constitutional rights as intermediate 
conclusions is more mirage than reality. I believe that 
specificationism has the resources to expose the received 
approach on this point, so that Webber can at the end of the day 
rightfully adopt a specificationist account of constitutional rights. 
Andrei Marmor is instructive here. Discussing general 
constitutional rights and their intermediary role, Marmor first 
makes the Razian point that “[s]ocieties where different groups 
of people are deeply divided about their conceptions of the 
good, need to settle on a set of rights they can all acknowledge, 
in spite of deep controversies regarding the grounds of those 
rights (and their ramifications).”11 Still, he argues, rights so 
understood represent very tenuous agreements that fall apart at 
crucial junctures. To determine the limitation of a right, Marmor 
explains, “one would naturally need to go back to the reasons for 
having the right in the first place, and it is precisely at this point 
that agreement breaks down. As a matter of fact, more often 
than not we will discover that there was never an agreement 
there to begin with.”12 It is precisely when rights must be limited 
or specified more precisely and duties actually imposed, then, 
that rights understood as consensual intermediate conclusions 
give out. The veil of generality and abstraction is lifted in such 
cases, revealing not deeper agreement about the right, but a 
cacophony of arguments from contentious first premises to 
controversial alleged duties. 
The weakness of general constitutional rights on this score 
can be illustrated by two kinds of cases. The first, which appears 
 
 11. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 152 (2d ed. 2005), 
excerpted in ARGUING ABOUT LAW 401, 409 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 
2009). 
 12. Id. 
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to be the type Marmor has in mind, is one where there is indeed 
agreement in the abstract, but not at a foundational level. We 
might all agree that there is a right of free expression, for 
example, but not agree about the nature of its justification. 
Despite our disparate grounds for recognizing the right, what 
consensus there is enables us to apply the right in a wide range 
of cases, and more specifically, just so long as the differing 
justifications share the same implications in particular cases. But 
therein lies the problem. As soon as a controversy arises that 
commands no univocal resolution, but instead elicits different 
proposed dispositions reflecting the different grounds people 
have for recognizing the right of free expression, those contested 
underlying justifications move to the fore and all semblance of 
agreement disappears. What is left is unencumbered first-order 
normative argument, not from consensual place-holding 
constitutional rights, as the received approach envisions, but 
towards constitutional rights, as specificationism holds. In such a 
case, one cannot avoid arguing towards and specifying the 
constitutional right of free expression by adjudging competing 
conceptions of the point and value of free expression, like the 
Millian “marketplace of ideas” account or the non-instrumental 
autonomy-based one. A final if controversial disposition is 
required, which will likely be based on equally controversial 
premises. Hard cases may make bad law, but we must still settle 
them. Whatever settlement is made, moreover, by definition 
designates conclusive rights and duties, even if the settlement 
could not likely gain everyone’s acceptance. Rights understood 
in this specified way remain a lingua franca to the extent that 
everyone knows what it means to have a right and to be subject 
to a duty, even though there may be little consensus about the 
content of those forms. 
There is a second sort of case that counts against the 
received approach’s embrace of general rights even more 
pointedly, and that is one where there never was any consensus, 
intermediate or otherwise, about there being a right at all. The 
best exemplar of such a state of affairs is the debate surrounding 
the constitutional right to an abortion in the United States. No 
one can deny that there is such a constitutional right—as a 
matter of positive law, it is beyond doubt—but there is nowhere 
near universal popular support for it. Consequently, “the right to 
an abortion” cannot be the placeholder that the received 
approach requires, facilitating inquiry into narrower questions 
like the potential right to a late-term abortion. Attorneys who 
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argue against the constitutionality of late-term abortion in court 
will of course address Roe and Casey in their briefs, but that 
recognition falls far short of the image that the received 
approach promotes, in which Roe and Casey state intermediate 
conclusions that hold our society together and from which more 
specific conclusions can be drawn. Constitutional norms can only 
hold a society together in this way if they are widely accepted, 
but when it comes to abortion in the United States, that wide 
acceptance is absent. Indeed, if attorneys arguing against the 
constitutionality of late-term abortion before the Supreme Court 
do not believe (or if their clients do not believe) that Roe and 
Casey were themselves correctly decided, they may just as likely 
attack those precedents directly as attempt to accommodate or 
parry them. The received approach makes no space for this kind 
of dissent. This is because the controversy surrounding abortion 
rights entails that they cannot serve as placeholders, as the 
received approach requires of rights. The right to an abortion, on 
that view, is therefore a kind of aberration—a constitutional 
right in name only. This is sufficient reason to reject the received 
approach, for despite the controversy surrounding abortion, 
there is nevertheless a bona fide constitutional right to an 
abortion in the United States. 
It is worth adding that the received approach is not saved by 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court locates the 
constitutional right to an abortion under the more abstract 
rubric of privacy, support for which is far more widespread. For 
no one who cares about the constitutional status of abortion is 
fooled into thinking that a broader debate about the widely 
accepted right to privacy will yield agreement about the 
constitutionality of abortion. If anything, subsuming the 
constitutional right to an abortion under the right to privacy 
jeopardizes the consensus about that latter right’s constitutional 
status. If privacy grounds the right to an abortion and one 
steadfastly believes that there should be no constitutional right 
to an abortion, one could argue that privacy does not deserve the 
protection that the Supreme Court affords it—one person’s 
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. Going abstract in the 
way the received approach counsels, in short, just does not work 
when it comes to resolving constitutional controversies about 
matters that have never commanded consensus. 
Specificationism can tolerate disagreement about 
constitutional rights in a way that the received approach cannot. 
This is because specificationism treats constitutional rights as 
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conclusive determinations of entitlements and duties. That there 
may be little agreement along the way towards those 
conclusions, or about the conclusions themselves, does not 
undermine the very idea of there being constitutional rights 
under specificationism as it clearly does under the received 
approach. Nothing in this argument, moreover, depends on a 
claim that law is in general controversial. As a general matter, no 
one should deny that there is widespread agreement about the 
law, but the above examples illustrate that there can also be 
deep disagreements, especially with respect to constitutional 
rights. What deep disagreements there are must be theoretically 
accommodated by an account of constitutional rights. 
Specificationism, but not the received approach, does this. 
Specificationism maintains that constitutional rights are hard-
fought final, if potentially narrow, conclusions that entail duties, 
not intermediate conclusions of broad compass that command 
widespread acceptance, as the received approach holds. That 
latter picture fails to account for too many authentic 
constitutional rights. 
Webber is therefore right to endorse specified constitutional 
rights and reject the received approach. Yet while I can 
ultimately join him in supporting the idea of specified 
constitutional rights, I cannot accept Webber’s particular 
conception of them. In brief, and as noted above, Webber takes 
an unapologetically Waldronian line, holding that the legislature 
should be both the source and judge of any limitation on rights: 
the legislature both “is not only a possible, but in many respects 
a necessary author of a right’s limitation” (p. 150), and “should 
be identified as the judge of the proper limitation against which 
to evaluate the legislature’s limitation on a constitutional right” 
(p. 179). He parts with Waldron only in supporting some judicial 
review, albeit a very weak form, in which a legislative limitation 
on a constitutional right could be overruled only for a “clear 
mistake” (p. 209), and then only after grudgingly accepting that 
the practice exists, lamenting that “[w]e may regret the advent of 
judicial review” (p. 203). In these closing lines, my aim is simply 
to point out that specificationism about constitutional rights 
need not end up where Webber takes it, and secondarily to 
suggest that Webber’s destination is not a place one should want 
to end up. 
“Who decides?” is a question that always looms large in 
law, and any account of the limitation of constitutional rights 
must answer it. Webber boldly answers that it is the legislature 
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that ought to decide both how to limit any right initially and 
whether that limitation is proper upon further review. The 
arguments that he gives for the lofty status he accords the 
legislature are familiar chiefly from Waldron’s work.13 But while 
Webber follows Waldron in taking very seriously the so-called 
circumstances of politics—the fact of intractable normative 
disagreement—and contends that a thorough majoritarianism is 
the only plausible response to it, he nowhere addresses the many 
compelling challenges that have been put to Waldron on that 
score, which I will simply gesture towards. The most 
fundamental of these is well-stated by Aileen Kavanagh: “if 
disagreement about the best means of protecting rights is the 
ground on which we should reject the institution of judicial 
review, then it is difficult to see why it does not impugn 
participatory majoritarianism on the very same grounds.”14 The 
fact of normative disagreement, in short, cannot drive one to an 
all-encompassing majoritarianism given that it, too, fails to 
command anything like universal support. Nor does Webber 
consider Cécile Fabre’s powerful objection to Waldron that 
putting rights against the state and its legislative whims beyond 
the reach of everyday democratic politics is the only way of 
providing the protection that is owed to the autonomous persons 
who ideally populate a democracy.15 Nor does he engage with 
rejoinders like David Estlund’s, suggesting that Waldron must 
value the substantive outcomes and not just the procedure of 
unbridled majoritarianism—what, after all, is the point of 
valorizing reasoned democratic debate if not that it portends 
better legislative conclusions?16 Webber’s refusal to address 
these and other criticisms—and there is a not-so-small cottage 
industry devoted to responding to Waldron’s work on 
democracy—amounts, in my view, to a considerable omission. 
Whether adequately argued for or not, though, the question 
remains: does specificationism itself require that constitutional 
rights be limited and/or reviewed through majoritarian 
procedures? 
 
 13. See especially Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional 
Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993), and Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2005). 
 14. Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy 
Waldron, 22 LAW & PHIL. 451, 467 (2003).  
 15. See Cécile Fabre, The Dignity of Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 271 
(2000). 
 16. See DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 95–96 (2007). 
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In a word, no. Nor does Webber appear to disagree. While 
he does make claims, like the one quoted above, about a 
legislature being a “necessary author of a right’s limitation,” that 
necessity does not appear to be born of specificationism but 
rather of completely separable considerations of political 
legitimacy (which Webber also would have done well to defend 
more assiduously). Even on Webber’s view, in other words, 
constitutional specificationism does not itself require 
majoritarian limitation. If we wish to isolate and assess the 
merits of the specified conception of constitutional rights, and if 
we wish to defend it, it is important not to overlook this. The 
theory is obviously controversial quite apart from any affiliation 
it may have with Waldron’s emphatic commitment to 
majoritarian politics. That it stands against a view called “the 
received approach” is evidence enough of that. Even if one lacks 
misgivings about Waldron’s views—though I admit to 
telegraphing some of mine in the previous paragraph—one can 
recognize both that a theory is easier to defend the thinner it is 
and that commitments like Waldron’s only weigh a theory down. 
As an avowed partisan defending specificationism about rights, 
and now following Webber in defending specified constitutional 
rights, I want to give the theory every possible chance to 
convince. 
 
